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VOUCHERS AND BUCKLEY: THE NEED FOR "REGIME
CHANGE"
Richard L. Hasen *

I. INTRODUCTION

Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres are the latest in a series of
scholars going back to the 1960s recommending the use of campaign finance vouchers in federal elections. 1 Their proposal is
noteworthy in three important respects: (1) they combine vouchers with mandatory anonymity of campaign contributions over
$200 (what they term the "secret donation booth"); 2 (2) they would
use vouchers to supplement, not supplant, private financing of
elections;3 and (3) they provide elaborate details (in part through
a model statute) on how their proposal would work in practice,
giving careful consideration to concerns about fraud and a black
market in vouchers.4

* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.

B.A., 1986, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., 1988, University of California, Los
Angeles; J.D., 1991, University of California, Los Angeles; Ph.D., 1992, University of California, Los Angeles.
Thanks to Ned Foley, Beth Garrett, Dan Lowenstein, and Tom Mann for useful comments and suggestions.
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002). I have traced the history of the voucher idea back to a 1967
proposal by Senator Lee Metcalf and picked up by Professors Adamany and Agree. See
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicFinance Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 & n.88 (1996); see also Bruce
Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 AM.
PROSPECT 71, 72 n.* (1993) (noting Metcalfs ideas). For some reason, Ackerman and Ayres
choose to ignore the history of the idea in their book-there are at least twenty-five references to their idea as the "new paradigm" in the first 100 pages of the book. In contrast,
the authors readily trace the intellectual pedigree of their "secret donation booth" idea. See
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra, at 268-69 n.26.
2. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 96.
3. See generally id. at 16-20.
4. See, e.g., id. at 213-17 (Citizen Sovereignty Act §§ 19-21).
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The authors put forward enough intriguing ideas in each of
these three areas to justify further exploration in an essay. For
example, the tools they propose to prevent the sale of vouchers allocated through choices made at ATM machines could fruitfully
be employed to prevent the sale of votes should jurisdictions decide to adopt Internet voting.5
My focus, however, is on the authors' views of the seminal
campaign finance case of Buckley v. Valeo,6 and whether their
voucher proposal would be effective and desirable in the absence
of a change in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the campaign finance area. The authors claim
that Buckley, rather than an obstacle to reform, was more or less
correctly decided, and that their program is fully consistent with
Buckley's mandates.'
Unfortunately, the authors underestimate how the Buckley
framework would limit the benefits of their proposal. Buckley's
rules on issue advocacy8 and individual expenditure limits9 would
render the voucher program and the mandatory donor anonymity
plan far less effective than the authors suggest. Although the
voucher plan would still be an improvement on the current system, many of the modern problems of campaign finance would
remain. Comprehensive reform must await a fundamental change
in our campaign finance regime.

5. See id. at 208-09 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 14(f)-(g)). For the potential fraud
problems with Internet voting, see Richard L. Hasen, Introduction to Symposium, Internet
Voting and Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 982 (2001). Voter turnout might rise
with the use of Internet voting because it will be easier to verify vote buying deals: 'The
briber stands over the recipient of the bribe and watches her cast the Internet vote. The
money is then turned over." See id. Ackerman and Ayres propose that any voting through
ATM machines (or presumably over the Internet) would be subject to a five-day cooling off
period allowing the voter to change her mind at any point during the period, thereby disrupting the market. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 69.
In general, the authors do a very good job discussing means to assure that allocations of
voucher dollars and contributions to political campaigns remain anonymous from candidates and would-be voucher purchasers. They do not seem to consider as serious problems,
however, the possibility of fraud or hacking into computer systems running the voucher
program or keeping contributions secret. Cf. BILL JONES, CAL. INTERNET VOTING TASK
FORCE, A REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERNET VOTING: JANUARY 2000 (discussing
feasibility of Internet voting in face of security problems), available at http://www.ss.ca.
gov/executive/ivote/final-report.htm.
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 156.
8. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-51.
9. See id. at 51-54.
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Part II of this essay sets forth the basics of campaign finance
law as established in Buckley, Ackerman and Ayres's views on the
correctness of Buckley, and an analysis of whether the authors'
proposal is consistent with Buckley. Part III explains how Buckley
interferes with the efficient working of the Ackerman and Ayres
proposal. It illustrates the problems Buckley creates by drawing
upon the book's hypothetical discussion of how the 2000 presidential election would have been conducted had the authors' proposal
been put into place. Finally, Part IV provides some concluding
thoughts on why massive reform must await the end of the Buckley regime.
II. LIVING WITH THE BUCKLEY REGIME' °
A. Buckley's Rules
In brief, Buckley upheld various contribution limits contained
in the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Elections Campaign Act
("FECA"), including a $1000 limit on individual contributions to
federal candidates. 1 It also struck down expenditure limits, including a $1000 limit on independent expenditures "relative to a
clearly identified candidate,"" limits on a candidate's use of personal or family wealth to run a campaign, 3 and limits on total
campaign spending by candidates for federal office.' 4
Although recognizing that any law regulating campaign financing was subject to the "exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment," the Court mandated divergent treatment of contributions and expenditures for two reasons. First, the Court held

10. Part II.A draws on two earlier articles discussing Buckley's rules. See Richard L.
Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and "The Thing That Wouldn't Leave," 17
CONST. COMMENT. 483, 486-87 (2000); Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using
Empirical Evidence To Determine the Constitutionality of CampaignFinanceLaws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1775-77 (2001). For a comprehensive
look at Buckley and post-Buckley campaign finance regulation, see DANIEL H.
LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 705-1080 (2d

ed. 2001).
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35.
12. Id. at 39-51.
13. Id. at 52-55.
14. Id. at 55-58.
15. Id. at 16.
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that campaign expenditures were core political speech, but a limit
on the amount of campaign contributions limits only marginally
restricted a contributor's ability to send a message of support for
a candidate.1 6 Thus, expenditures were entitled to greater constitutional protection than contributions. Second, the Buckley Court
recognized only the interests in prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption as justifying infringement on First
Amendment rights. 7 The Court held that large contributions
raise the problem of corruption "[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current
and potential officeholders .. ."s But truly independent expenditures do not raise the same danger of corruption because a quid
pro quo is more difficult if the politician and spender cannot
communicate about the expenditure.19 Finally, the Court rejected
a proposed equality rationale for limiting expenditures, finding
the idea was "wholly foreign to the First Amendment."2" Although
various members of the Court have since questioned the distinction between contributions and expenditures,2 1 a majority of the
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its adherence to the distinction.
Despite striking down expenditure limits, including limits on
what federal candidates could spend on their own campaigns, the
Court in Buckley held that
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and
may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the
candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations. Just as a
candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he

16.
17.

Id. at 21.
See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97

(1985) ("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate
and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.")
18.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.

19. Id. at 46-47. The Court also remarked that expenditure limits could be circumvented easily, meaning that such limits would serve "no substantial societal interest." Id.
at 45.
20. Id. at 48-49.
21. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 410
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should "subject campaign contribution limitations to strict scrutiny"); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 678 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger made the same point in his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Buckley itself. 424 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("For me contributions and expenditures are two sides
of the same First Amendment coin.").
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may decide to forgo private fundraising and acchooses to accept, he
22
cept public funding.

In so holding, the Court approved the system that FECA put in
place for financing presidential elections. Note that the Buckley
standard for coupling public financing with expenditure limits
requires voluntariness; 23 whether particular public financing laws
are voluntary or coercive continues to be litigated as jurisdictions
pass new laws conditioning the receipt of public financing on a
candidate agreeing to give up certain fund-raising techniques the
law otherwise would allow.24
The Court in Buckley also marked out a line between "express
advocacy," which could be regulated, and "issue advocacy," which
could not.25 Through FECA, Congress sought to impose limits on
any spending "relative to a clearly identified candidate '26 in federal elections, and to require "'[elvery person ...who makes contributions or expenditures ... for the purpose of... influencing'
the nomination or election of candidates for federal office '27 to
disclose the source of such contributions and expenditures. The
Court in Buckley viewed both of these statutes as presenting
problems of vagueness; people engaging in political speech might
not know if the statutes cover their conduct. 28 Vague statutes violate the Due Process Clause and are a special concern when the
danger of chilling the First Amendment rights of free speech and
freedom of association comes into play. 29
In order to save both statutes from unconstitutional vagueness,
the Court construed them as reaching only "communications that
in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."3 ° The Court explained that such express advo-

22. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205
F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-44.
26. Id. at 41 (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-443, tit. I, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265, repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, tit. II, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496).
27. Id. at 77 (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, tit. II, §
204(c), amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, tit. I, § 104).
28. Id. at 45, 76-77.
29. Id. at 77.
30. Id. at 44; see also id. at 80 (construing the term "expenditure" to have the same
meaning in § 434(e) as the Court earlier construed it in § 608(e) of FECA).

1054

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1049

cacy required "express words of advocacy of election or defeat,
such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for
*Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [or] 'reject."'3 1 So construed, the
Court still struck down the spending limits as violating the First
Amendment,32 but it upheld the disclosure requirements.3 3
The upshot of this part of Buckley is that advertisements intended to influence the outcome of an election, but lacking words
of express advocacy, are unregulated by FECA. Such advertisements have come to be referred to as "issue advocacy," even
though the prime issue at stake in many of these advertisements
is the election or defeat of a candidate.34 I refer to such advertisements as "sham issue advocacy." Thus, an advertisement lacking "magic words" of express advocacy but criticizing Senator
Smith in the weeks before an election is not subject to disclosure
under FECA, may be paid for with corporate or union funds, and
is subject to no contribution limits. 5 The conduct escapes FECA
because the advertisement ends with something like "Call Smith
and tell her what you think of her Medicare plan" rather than
"Defeat Smith."
Sham issue advocacy has exploded on the federal election campaign scene. Individuals, political parties, interest groups, labor
unions, and corporations spent as much as $150 million in 1996
on such advertisements.3 6 The figure climbed to at least $250 million during the 1998 election,3 7 and reached $509 million for the
2000 election cycle.38 Political parties have been especially fond of
issue advocacy. By declining to use express advocacy, the parties
have raised unlimited amounts of "soft money" from individuals,

31. Id. at 44 n.52.
32. Id. at 48-49.
33. Id. at 80-81.
34. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
35. See Glenn J. Moramarco, Beyond "Magic Words": Using Self-Disclosure To Regulate Electioneering, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 118-21 (1999) (exploring the origins of the
term "express advocacy" as well as the "magic words" required by the Court in its Buckley
analysis).
36. DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996
CAMPAIGN 3 (1997) available at http://www.appcpenn.org/reports/1997.
37. Lorie Slass, Spending on Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Cycle, in ISSUE ADVERTISING
IN THE 1999-2000 ELECTION CYCLE 3, 4 (2001), available at http://www.appcpenn.
org/political/issueads/1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf.
38. Id.
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corporations, and unions to pay for advertisements promoting
their candidates,39 and, more often, defeating their opponents.4"
The new Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA")41 bans
some forms of soft money42 and regulates some forms of sham issue advocacy through a "bright line" electioneering test aimed at
radio and television advertising featuring a clearly identified
candidate in a sixty-day period before a general election or a
thirty-day period before a primary.4 3 Corporations, unions, and
interest groups receiving corporate or union funds cannot pay for
such advertisements except through separate segregated funds.44
Further, anyone running such advertising over a certain dollar
threshold must disclose contributions and expenditures funding
the advertising.45 Soon enough, the Supreme Court may consider
the constitutionality of these provisions.46
B. Ackerman and Ayres on Buckley's Rules
Ackerman and Ayres criticize those would-be reformers who
call for the Supreme Court to overrule Buckley as "apolog[ists]"
operating under the "old paradigm."4 7 They make a two-pronged
attack. First, the authors claim that their "new paradigm authorizes massive changes now,"4" a claim evaluated in the next part of
this essay. Second, they claim that Buckley was correctly decided

39. Parties must disclose the source and amount of such contributions under regulations promulgated by the Federal Election Commission. 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(e)-(f) (2002).
40. These advertisements tend to be more negative than campaign advertising containing magic words. See BECK ET AL., supra note 36, at 9-10 (noting that issue ads contained more "pure attack" style ads than did other campaign advocacy formats).
41. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) [hereinafter BCRA].
42. Id. sec. 101(a).
43. Id. sec. 201(f)(3)(i).
44. Id. sec. 203(b)(3)(B). See generally LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 10, at
ELECTION LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS: 2002 UPDATE 29-39 (2d ed. Supp. 2002), available at www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/pubs/electionlaw-2002update.pdf.
45. BCRA sec. 201(f)(1).
46. The constitutionality of BCRA is currently being challenged in McConnell v. FEC,
No. 02-582 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 2002). See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, McConnell (No. 02-582), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/campaign
finance/mcconnell.3.27.2002.pdf.
47. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 10.
48. Id.
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key holding
for the most part, all the while ignoring Buckley's
49
limits.
expenditure
independent
down
striking
The authors focus most of their attention on the Buckley
Court's decision striking down limits on how much a candidate
for federal office may spend on her campaign." They argue that
overruling Buckley on this point would "mak[e] it even easier for
incumbents to assure their endless reelection without serious
challenge" because challengers need more money than incumbents to make up for the advantages of incumbency.51 The authors further contend that sitting incumbents "may be delighted
by the prospect of 'campaign reforms' that allow them to impose
severe limits on overall expenditures."52 They conclude, therefore,
that "[w]hen viewed from this angle, Buckley's twin principlesagainst expenditure ceilings, for public subsidies-remind us that
we have something to fear from entrenched politicians as well as
entrenched wealth; and that reformers should not be eager to exchange one master for another in the struggle for democracy. " "
In this regard, the authors have set up something of a straw
man. Most reformers seek to limit the amount candidates or others can donate to a specific campaign or spend on a candidate's
behalf, they do not advocate limits on total campaign spending.
As Justice Brennan remarked at the time the Court was considering Buckley, it is "hard to see the nexus" between the overall limitation and the limitation on contributions and expenditures: "[I]f
limitation on contributions and expenditures are valid, the overall-limitation is difficult to justify."54 Brennan saw this as a serious equal protection problem, disadvantaging challengers."
Most supporters of vouchers and other radical campaign finance reform measures spend considerable time discussing
whether Buckley should be overruled to allow for limits on: (1) independent expenditures; and (2) expenditures from a candidate's
own personal funds. The authors do not do so in this book. First,

49. See id. at 11; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976).
50. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 156.
51. Id. at 156-57.
52. Id. at 157.
53. Id.
54. Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION
L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 9, on file with author) (quoting Justice Brennan).
55. Id.
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as a policy matter, they do not favor caps on independent expenditures. 56 Thus, the authors do not reprise Ackerman's implausible argument-made in connection with his initial voucher proposal that would have banned independent expenditures-that it
would be an "easy constitutional case" to ban the use of "green"
money in favor of "red-white-and-blue" vouchers."
Second, they devote very little attention to the problem of selffinanced candidates. They briefly argue against the practice, stating that they would reverse Buckley on this point if they were on
the Court.5" They reason that it is inegalitarian for "rich people"
to have "special privileges when they compete for public office in
democratic politics." 59 The authors, however, quickly drop any
further discussion on this point-impliedly negating their own
point that Buckley poses no obstacles to reform-because they believe that "the current majority of Justices" would stick with
Buckley on the right of candidates to bankroll their own campaigns."
Ackerman and Ayres also flirt with redrawing Buckley's line
between express advocacy and issue advocacy.6 1 In their model
statute, however, they punt on what should be regulated, purporting to regulate advertising "which refers to any candidate or
political party or contains such other content of a political nature
as the [newly constituted Federal Election Commission] by regulation shall designate."62 A footnote following this section explains
"the commission should seek to capture 'sham' issue advocacy
while excluding non-political speech that innocuously refers to po-

56. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 32 (rejecting what they term the "abolitionist" position).
57. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 79, 80; see also ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at
44 n.21 (noting that Ackerman has changed his position on this question). For a criticism
of Ackerman's earlier constitutional 'analysis, see Hasen, supra note 1, at 44 n.202. See
also Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:A Constitutional Principle of Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1211-12 (1994) (arguing that eliminating private campaign expenditures in favor of voucher-based public financing would require the Court to
overrule Buckley).
58. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 62.
59. Id. It is unclear if the authors would extend this criticism of Buckley to attack that
part of the opinion allowing rich non-candidates to spend unlimited sums on behalf of others.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 119-20.
62. Id. at 187 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 2(6)).
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litical issues. 63 In the body of the book, however, the authors are
quite critical of the BCRA's attempt to redefine the line between
express advocacy and issue advocacy,6 4 and they assume the
Court would not allow any further regulation in this area beyond
the current "magic words" test for express advocacy.65
Their alternative route to regulation is modest; they aim to expand the number of organizations whose conduct is regulated not
because the organizations use express advocacy, but because
their "major purpose" is the election or defeat of candidates.66
Currently, political parties count as "major purpose" organizations, and the authors would plausibly extend the definition to include those interest groups organized to collect voucher dollars
from voters and to distribute them to candidates.6 ' They do, however, recognize that the obvious consequence of this will be that
such groups will simply bifurcate their functions into a "major
purpose" group that will accept voucher dollars and follow rules
concerning donor anonymity, and an affiliated group that need
not follow any of these rules.68
C. The Constitutionalityof the Ackerman and Ayres Proposal
Although the details of the Ackerman and Ayres proposal are
exceedingly complex, down to mathematical algorithms for ensuring the secrecy of large donations made to candidates' campaigns
and special formulas for the FEC to use to calibrate the "right"
amount of money in the system, the basics are easy to set out.
Each voter gets fifty voucher dollars to allocate in an election cy-

63. Id. at 288 n..
64. See, e.g., id. at 119-20.
65. Id. at 120. The authors appear confused in this discussion, incorrectly stating that
the Court has upheld the power of Congress to "limit independent expenditures that expressly endorse a candidate." Id. at 119. Outside the context of corporations, this statement is plainly incorrect. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990);
see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Book Review, 116 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 6-9, on file with author) (reviewing ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, and
noting authors' confusion on this point).
66. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 125. For more on regulating major purpose organizations, see Richard L. Hasen, The Constitutionalityof a Soft Money Ban After
Colorado Republican II, 1 ELECTION L.J. 195, 206 (2002).
67. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 125.
68. Id.
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cle to candidates, parties, or interest groups.6 9 Voucher allocations are secret.7" Private individuals may donate up to $100,000
to candidates for president, $5000 to congressional candidates,
and a significant sum to Senate candidates based on a population
formula.7 ' These donations are secret, except a contributor could
get proof she had donated up to $200 to a campaign.7 2 Contributions to fund independent expenditure campaigns using express
advocacy to support or oppose candidates for federal office are
limited to $5000 per year per organization, with a $25,000 overall
cap.

73

Candidates who wish to accept voucher dollars may not contribute funds to their campaigns exceeding the contribution limits
applicable to others.7 4 Interest groups who have registered to collect voucher dollars may transfer them to candidates, but cannot
use the funds for independent expenditure campaigns.75 Interest
groups that do not take voucher dollars can, however, collect
unlimited contributions and spend unlimited sums from any
corporate, labor, and foreign money) on sham
source (including
7
issue advocacy. 1
The Ackerman and Ayres proposal appears to fit comfortably
on the Buckley side of constitutionality. The voucher program is
voluntary for candidates. 77 The proposal allows very generous
contribution limits (with an inflation index),78 which are much
higher than the low limits the Court approved in Buckley 79 and
69. See id. at 209-10 (Citizen Sovereignty Act §§ 15-16(a)). The authors favor suballocations of the fifty dollars across presidential, Senate, and House races. See id. at 76.
70. Id. at 199 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(a)).
71. Id. at 204 (Citizen Sovereignty Act §10(e)). The proposal also allows candidates to
accept larger contributions for exploratory committees. See id. at 206-07 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 12(a)).
72. Id. at 201-02 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 8(h)(1)).
73. Id. at 204 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(f)).
74. Id. at 205-06 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 11(b)).
75. Id. at 211 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 16(f)).
76. Id. at 205 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 10(k)). Section 10(k) allows nonaffiliated interest groups to accept any funds from any source without limitations to spend on anything other than contributions or expenditures. Id. Expenditures are limited to those for
express advocacy only, unless the commission can and will craft regulations reining in
some of this sham issue advocacy. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. But the
authors appear to believe that such regulations likely would be unconstitutional. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77. AcKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 205-06 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 11(b)).
78. See id. at 112-13.
79. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (upholding a $1000 limit on individual con-
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Shrink Missouri."° The proposal also puts no limit on individual
independent expenditures,"' and appears to do very little, if anything, to change the definition of express advocacy. 2
I suppose the most serious challenge to the proposal would concern its mandatory anonymity of contributions.8 3 Mandatory anonymity is a bad idea for two reasons. First, it deprives voters of
useful information about who is supporting candidates.8 4 Second,
it fosters a relationship of mistrust between elected officials and
potential donors. 5 The reality is that elected officials depend
upon donors (and of course others) to provide information to make
good legislative decisions. Encouraging lying is hardly a way to
instill trust in other areas of the relationship. Indeed, the mandatory anonymity proposal may drive trustworthy donors from the
market.8 "
But bad policy alone does not make a plan unconstitutional.
The proposal does not stop anyone from saying anything or from
using money to pay for a political message. It simply provides
tools for others to make false claims about donations made to

tributions to federal candidates).
80. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm. 528 U.S. 377, 382-83 (2000)
(upholding a Missouri law that limited individual contributions to statewide candidates to
$1075).
81. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 205 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 11(a)). On the
constitutionality of limiting contributions to groups funding independent expenditure
campaigns, see Lincoln Club of Orange County v. City of Irvine, 292 F.3d 934 (9th Cir.
2002).
82. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 120.
83. See id. at 211 (Citizen Sovereignty Act § 16 (d)).
84. See LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 10, at 987 (discussing the benefits of promoting the informational interest through disclosure). Ackerman and Ayres downplay this
informational interest at certain points. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 27
("Quite simply, if most voters pay scant attention to politics, they won't take the time to go
through the lengthy list of donors published in the name of 'full information.'"). In so doing, they make an empirical claim that candidates do not turn down largely tainted gifts
but offer scant anecdotal evidence to support it. See id. at 27 n.3. More importantly, they
do not seem to believe their own claim; they "expect the public and the press to sit up and
take notice whenever the Federal Election Commission reports the flow of patriotic contributions to each candidate." Id. at 74. Elizabeth Garrett explains that, in fact, the Ackerman and Ayres proposal allows for far more disclosure than the authors suggest. Elizabeth
Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1020-21, 1037-38 (2003).
85. I credit Tom Mann with making this important point in an informal conversation.
The authors claim that the state is not endorsing lying. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1,
at 29. At the very least, however, it is facilitating misinformation by providing documents
falsifying the making of a donation to a candidate.
86. See Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Paying for Politics, in DESIGNING
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 55, 63 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000).
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candidates. Nothing in the First Amendment, or in any other
provision of the Constitution, appears to bar the mandatory anonymity idea.

III. A TALE OF TWO ELECTIONS: VOUCHERS IN A HYPOTHETICAL
2000 CAMPAIGN
The hostility the authors repeatedly show to reformers who
seek to overturn Buckley is curious, given that the authors have
truncated their own proposal to accommodate Buckley's proscription on capping candidate self-financing and resistance to redrawing the boundary between express advocacy and issue advocacy. 7
The authors nonetheless claim that their voucher plan will allow
for "massive change[s] now,""8 without any change in constitutional doctrine.
Whether their proposal indeed would lead to massive changes
depends of course upon what "massive" means. Certainly the
voucher portion of their proposal would be an improvement over
the current system of privately financed congressional campaigns
and weak public financing of presidential campaigns." Public financing will reduce the demand for private dollars by politicians,
thereby alleviating some potential corruption and the appearance
of corruption. It also may free some time for legislative business
that elected officials otherwise might spend raising money,9"
though my guess is that officials will simply substitute time chasing voucher dollars bundled by interest groups for time now spent
raising relatively small private donations.9 ' Officials will continue
to seek large private donations; certainly a presidential candidate
will earnestly court those $100,000 contributions.
The proposal would also promote a certain kind of egalitarianism by doling out public funds based upon voters' intensity of

87. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 118-20.
88. Id. at 10.
89. See generally Anthony Corrado, Financingthe 1996 PresidentialGeneral Election,
in FINANCING THE 1996 ELECTION 63, 92-93 (John C. Green ed., 1999), (discussing the

weaknesses of the current presidential election system).
90. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 COLUM. L.

REV. 1281, 1281-84 (1994) (discussing the benefits associated with candidates spending
less time on fund-raising).

91. Hasen, supra note 1, at 30.
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preference. I have argued elsewhere that campaign finance
vouchers are a better means of aggregating preferences than
lump sum direct payments given to candidates who pass a (usually low) threshold of signatures or token contributions.9 2 But the
point is controversial: it assumes a "barometer" version of equality positing that the amount of expenditures on campaigns should
bear some relation to public support for the positions that the expenditures funded. It is an idea that the Supreme Court has cautiously embraced in some of its campaign finance cases,9 3 but one
that is not universally accepted. For example, lump sum public
financing payments may be better for third party candidates and
candidates who lack name recognition early in campaigns, and in
that way may promote a different egalitarian ideal.9 4
Nonetheless, the benefits of the Ackerman and Ayres proposal
will not be "massive" because the proposal keeps private money in
the system and does not redraw the line between express advocacy and issue advocacy. Money will simply shift to unregulated
activities,9" leading to the continued potential for corruption, the
appearance of corruption, and inequality in campaign financing.
And, although the authors suggest that interest groups would be
much less likely to receive special interest deals from Congress,9 6
that seems more like wishful thinking than careful analysis.
To illustrate my conclusions more clearly, let us consider-as
the authors do in their concluding chapter-how the 2000 election
would have looked had it been run with the Ackerman and Ayres
proposal in place.

92.

Id. at 45-48; see also ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 20-22.

93. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 227-31, on file

with author) (discussing the history of the barometer equality rationale and the Supreme
Court's flirtation with it).
94. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 47.
95.

The authors term this argument the "hydraulic" critique. See ACKERMAN & AYRES,

supra note 1, at 118; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999). Ayres recognized it more

forcefully in his earlier account of his mandatory anonymity proposal. See Ian Ayres, Disclosure Versus Anonymity in CampaignFinance, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
19, 40 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000) ("The predictable, hydraulic shift of contributions toward less accountable issue advocacy-even if only partial-is a reasonable
ground for ultimately opposing a mandated anonymity regime.").
96. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 171-73.
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I will not recount the details of the 2000 election campaign
here; readers unfamiliar with the details can review important
articles on the topic in a new anthology on the 2000 elections."
The most notable campaign finance feature of the 2000 election
was George W. Bush's fund-raising. Bush opted out of the presidential matching fund for primary financing and raised an impressive $94.5 million under the FECA rules-$91 million from
individual contributions of $1000 or less and the remainder in
PAC contributions up to $5000.98 Much of this funding was raised
by his group of "Pioneers," long-time Bush supporters who
pledged to raise $100,000 in contributions from friends and colleagues. 99 Bush then took public financing for the general election
(in the amount of $67.56 million' 0 ) and helped the Republican
party raise soft money. The Republicans spent an estimated $44.7
million on television advertising supporting Bush, much of it
funded by soft money Bush helped raise.'
According to Ackerman and Ayres, here's how the presidential
race likely would have looked under their proposal: Bush would
have raised $1 million for an exploratory committee from close
friends, and then would have opted for voluntary voucher financing."0 2 The authors reason that he would opt for vouchers because
failing to do so would leave the way open for competitors like
Elizabeth Dole and John McCain to receive voucher dollars, and
Bush would know that his "private fundraising prospects would
decline dramatically-thanks to the secret donation booth."0I 3
Dole and McCain would have remained in the race longer thanks
to voucher dollars, and Dole, bridging the gender gap, likely
would have captured the Republican nomination. 1 4 Ultimately,

97. See Anthony Corrado, Financing the 2000 Presidential General Election, in
FINANCING THE 2000 ELECTION 79 (David B. Magleby ed., 2002); John C. Green & Nathan
S. Bigelow, The 2000 PresidentialNominations: The Costs of Innovation, in FINANCING
THE 2000 ELECTION 49 (David B. Magleby ed., 2002).
98. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 10, at 985.
99. Green & Bigelow, supra note 97, at 59.
100. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 10, at 984.
101. Corrado, supra note 97, at 94.
102. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 167.
103. Id. at 167. To the extent this point is correct, it suggests that the voucher plan
may be more coercive than voluntary, raising some constitutional concerns.
104. Id. at 170.
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the authors conclude, she would have beaten Democrat Al Gore to
become the first female president of the United States." 5
Not only is this scenario beyond fanciful, it is based upon more
unproven empirical assumptions than I can count. Let me focus,
however, on just a few assumptions in presenting an alternate
scenario that is just as plausible. In spinning out my alternative
scenario, it is worth reminding readers that George W. Bush was
a popular governor in Texas before he ran for president. He was
an accomplished fund-raiser in his state, a good-looking, folksy
southerner with a great name. He was anointed early by the Republican elite as representing the best chance for Republicans to
take the White House back from the Democrats.
In my scenario, Bush completely opts out of the voucher plan,
thereby rallying the Pioneers (many of whom supported Bush in
Texas, where the voucher program does not apply to state races)
to "put their money where their mouth is" and support his campaign. The Pioneers have the financial ability to make significantly larger donations than the $1000 currently allowed under
FECA because
[m]any Pioneers were business leaders, representing the finance, energy, real estate, and manufacturing sectors in roughly equal numbers, followed by a wide array of the other industries; they included
chief executive officers of major corporations, entrepreneurs, and
venture capitalists. However, the largest group of Pioneers was 1law6
yers and lobbyists, professional "brokers" in the political process. 0

Some of these Pioneers, therefore, make $100,000 contributions, as allowed by the Ackerman and Ayres proposal. Many give
smaller, but still significant, amounts. They also get their moneyed friends to make very generous donations. And, as a result,
Bush is awash in money (remember, he raised $91 million in
$1000 chunks!).0 7 Moreover, the secret donation booth hardly deters anyone from giving money for two reasons. 08 First, many of

105. Id. The authors also predict that third party candidates like Ralph Nader and Pat
Buchanan would have gotten a smaller share of the vote, because voters could allocate
their voucher dollars to these candidates while still casting a vote for a major party candidate. Id. at 169-70.
106. Green & Bigelow, supra note 97, at 59.
107. See LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 10, at 985.
108. The authors do not quantify how much mandatory anonymity will reduce giving,
though they note that the secret ballot is "estimated to have decreased voter turnout by
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these Pioneers have been trusted Bush allies since Bush ran for
governor, or from when Bush's father was in politics."°9 Second,
Bush will believe these Pioneers when they claim to have made
large contributions through the state-mandated blind trust. And
many could not care less whether Bush believes the claims or not;
they are pursuing an electoral strategy, not a legislative strategy. 1 ° The Pioneers want Bush to be elected because they know
he will be good for their interests, even if he grants them no special favors."'
True, some supporters of Bush may want to make sure he
knows they are spending large dollars to benefit his campaign. No
problem. A Bush supporter hires an advertising agency with no
ties to the Bush campaign to watch and mimic Bush's campaign
ads. The supporter then spends $10 million on advertisements
replicating Bush's message but lacking words of express advocacy. The supporter then leaks to the press that he, indeed,
funded the independent expenditure campaigns. 2
Ackerman and Ayres are apparently as naive as the Supreme
Court was in Buckley" 3 in believing that these independent media campaigns "may sometimes be entirely counterproductive,"" 4
with a "rather small" overall impact on the election. 1' 5 How hard
will mimicry be? There is no need for coordination; all a mimic
needs is television airtime and a large budget. The effects could
be tremendous.
about 12 percent." ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 30. The sources they cite show at
most a 6.9% decline caused by the move to the secret ballot, and it is not at all clear that a
decline in giving would match the decline in voting due to declining bribery possibilities.
See id. at 251 n.6 (citing Jack C. Heckelman, The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates, 82 PUB. CHOICE 107, 119 (1995)).
109. See Green & Bigelow, supra note 97, at 59-60.
110. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 301, 308 (1989) (explaining the distinction between
electoral and legislative strategies).
111. Cf. id.
112. Consider, for example, the $2.5 million that Bush supporter Sam Wyly spent on
advertisements attacking John McCain in New York before that state's primary. See Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributionsand Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 267-68 (2000) (discussing
Sam Wyly's expenditures favoring the Bush candidacy).
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) ("Unlike contributions, such independent
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed
may prove counterproductive.").
114. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 122.
115. Id. at 126.
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For example, the National Rifle Association decides that Bush
is the best person to be president. It spins off an arm that collects
voucher dollars, which decides to let the vouchers expire rather
than give them to McCain or Dole. Its separate PAC gives as
much money as it can to Bush, and it collects additional contributions from members to run sham issue advertisements supporting
the Bush presidential campaign ("Call Al Gore and ask him why
he wants to take away our precious constitutional rights").116 The
Republican Party, convinced that Bush is the right person for the
job, pumps in its money to promote Bush too.
Al Gore gets the Democratic nomination by virtue of incumbency. He opts for voucher financing, because Democrats have not
been as good as Republicans in locating people to make six-figure
donations. They find a few, however, who make donations to fund
sham issue advocacy, and the election goes down as by far the
most expensive in history, all coming down to a recount in Flor117
ida; we all know how that story ends.
Back in Congress, it is business as usual. Many members of
Congress have opted for voucher-based public financing. Some
have not. Most members know who their friends are, know who
ran the independent expenditure and issue advocacy campaigns
on their behalf, and know which organizations coughed up their
voucher dollars. Rent seeking continues to flourish.
What has changed? Marginally, politicians' demand for money
has decreased. Some organizations gain new clout as the bundlers
of voucher dollars. Some people are lying for political advantage
(this is news?). But the dynamics are the same as those that exist
in Washington today. Only now there is more money in the system and presumably more negative advertising all around. 1 8
IV.

CONCLUSION

If we really want "massive" change in our electoral system toward greater equality (and the authors simply assume that we do

116. See id. at 97 (noting that their proposal has "absolutely no intention of forcing the
secret donation booth on any organization that runs issue-oriented campaigns independent of a candidate's control").
117. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
118. See supra note 40.
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rather than try to convince us of the fact), the Supreme Court
must allow for a cap on independent expenditures and a limit on
candidate self-financing. It must also allow legislatures to redraw
the line between express advocacy and issue advocacy.
Expenditure limits are necessary for egalitarianism and to decrease rent seeking. We need a plan, however, that "levels down"
as well as "levels up." What good is a fifty-dollar voucher (of
which only twenty-five dollars goes to the presidential campaign)
when the wealthy can give presidential candidates $100,000? Ackerman and Ayres "do not deny the symbolic force" of such an argument," 9 but the issue is about real unequal influence over the
electoral process, not about symbolism.
Redrawing the issue advocacy line is necessary to prevent easy
end-runs around the political system. Ackerman and Ayres believe that further regulation in this area is futile because campaign consultants will always find ways around new definitions of
express advocacy. There will be significantly lower returns, however, for issue ads that cannot feature the name or likeness of
candidates. Regardless of whether the BCRA's redrawing of the
line is constitutional, it would likely be effective in curbing much
sham issue advocacy. The authors are plainly wrong in stating
that "[s]hort of abolition of free markets and private property,
there is simply no way to eliminate the influence of private
money on democratic politics." 2 '
In the end, Ackerman and Ayres have made suggestions that
will modestly change the workings of our campaign finance system. Some changes, like public financing of congressional campaigns, will improve the system. Other changes, like mandatory
donor anonymity and increasing individual contributions in
presidential campaigns to $100,000, will likely have negative effects. Massive reform, if it ever comes, awaits regime change in
the Supreme Court as well as many more people accepting egalitarian notions of campaign finance.

119.
120.

ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 1, at 44.
Id. at 120.

